The ongoing cutting and reorganization of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) signals the death of development. What was once a dominant framework of “development qua development”—the pursuit of development as an end in itself based on a universalist ideology—is now unraveling.
Historically, development aid was anchored in post–World War II norms that emphasized the universality of human rights, economic growth, and social progress. This ideological foundation intensified after the Cold War, when the United States emerged as the world’s leading hegemon. Development, it was assumed, benefited everyone, transcending the boundaries of politics and national interest. Today, that assumption is collapsing under the weight of an increasingly multipolar and insular world. This essay argues that “development qua development” is effectively dead and that the recent institutional reorganizations are symptomatic of a deeper global shift away from universal development ideals.
In the aftermath of World War II, the dominant rhetoric championed human rights and the idea of universal progress. The United States, buoyed by its economic might, assumed a guiding role in reconstructing war-torn regions and helping newly independent nations build their economies. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union offered its own model of development, reflecting an alternative ideological framework. Despite their differences, both superpowers embraced some notion of universality, asserting that their particular paths to development were valid for all nations.
When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, American hegemony reached its zenith, and the concept of “development qua development” became entrenched. This idea held that development was intrinsically good, that all humans shared certain universal rights, and that socioeconomic progress was a moral imperative. During this unipolar era, initiatives such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Gates Foundation’s global health campaigns, and the rise of Effective Altruism symbolized a late-stage culmination of development ideology. They largely sidestepped politics and assumed that universal benefits could be achieved by simply scaling up interventions. Underlying all of this was the implicit assumption that American-led liberal hegemony would last indefinitely.
At the time, few questioned the ideological and organizational superstructure that underpinned development. Yet it is precisely this superstructure—rooted in a post-Cold War confidence in universal progress and liberal norms—that is now dissolving.
The unraveling of American hegemony has exposed deep fissures in the traditional development model. China’s emergence as a major global power, along with regional conflicts and a U.S. increasingly reluctant to play the role of global policeman, has fragmented the international order. At the same time, domestic pressures and rising nationalism in many countries have fostered a more inward-looking approach. Governments find it harder to justify sending money abroad when populist demands call for investment at home.
Against this backdrop, large-scale, donor-led development has lost much of its luster. Where “development for development’s sake” once seemed self-evident, today it stands on shaky ground. Countries are increasingly repurposing aid to serve narrow national objectives, tying funding to strategic interests or security considerations rather than universal humanitarian values. These trends manifest in shifting donor priorities: the budgets of organizations like USAID and the former DFID face cuts, while newly merged agencies come under mandates emphasizing national goals over altruistic principles.
At the conceptual level, “development qua development” is dying because both its financing and its foundational ethos are eroding. Donor governments no longer see development as an inevitable or inherently virtuous endeavor. Meanwhile, there is no obvious alternative ideological framework waiting in the wings—no grand new vision to replace the universalist aspirations of the post-1945 world. The moral consensus that once propelled development programs is dissolving, and with it goes much of the momentum that fueled large-scale interventions.
In this shifting landscape, traditional development institutions face existential challenges. The recent restructuring at USAID and the earlier consolidations of DFID and CIDA are harbingers of a broader transformation. Agencies that once justified their budgets by emphasizing universal outcomes—reducing poverty, increasing health access, fostering governance—must now align themselves more explicitly with strategic and security interests. Legitimacy wanes as these institutions struggle to reconcile lofty humanitarian goals with the reality that political and economic priorities are increasingly inward-focused.
To survive, many development organizations may feel compelled to reimagine their missions. This will likely mean a more explicit alignment with national agendas: fewer broad-based interventions and more targeted programs serving the immediate interests of donor countries. Such a pivot effectively signals the end of the development industry as it has been known. Funding streams that once supported universalist endeavors are vanishing, and private philanthropy appears too limited to fill the gap. Mega-donors like Bill Gates or Open Philanthropy are anomalies rather than the norm, and there is little indication that more will emerge on a scale sufficient to replace government funding.
What lies ahead is a fractured, regional, and transactional model that lacks the unifying ethos of prior decades. It might be more pragmatic in some respects, focusing on local partnerships and smaller-scale projects, but it will almost certainly be worse funded. Local actors may seize opportunities to focus on economic growth, yet in most instances, organizational complexity and ambitions will wane.
From post-World War II reconstruction to the Cold War competition of ideologies, and later to the unipolar moment under U.S. hegemony, development aid once stood atop a universalist ideal. Over time, this model became deeply institutionalized, aided by powerful organizations and philanthropic efforts that collectively championed “development qua development.” Now, in an era marked by multipolarity and insularity, those underpinnings are deteriorating. The restructuring of institutions like USAID, DFID, and CIDA reflects not merely tactical policy shifts but a sign that the foundational belief in purely altruistic, universal development has slipped away.
As empires fade, so too does the economic and organizational complexity at their peripheries. Although it is conceivable that some countries will attempt to leverage this transition to refocus on economic growth and industrialization, the broader trend is sobering. Development as an unconditional moral and humanitarian quest is effectively over, replaced by narrower, self-interested approaches that fragment the global landscape. In this new reality, genuine progress may become more uneven and uncertain. The lofty promises of universal progress have given way to a patchwork of pragmatic deals and diminished ambitions. Development qua development is, indeed, dead. The question now is how the world—particularly the most vulnerable—will cope with the consequences of its demise.
